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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last decade, the use of ‘soft law’ has extended the boundaries of 
European Union (EU) involvement in healthcare, thereby pushing the 
Europeanization process to involve learning and adoption rather than institution-
building. Radaelli describes the process as “generating indirect pressures for 
adaption at national level via non-binding instruments”.1 However, the problem with 
soft law is that there are significant variations in its outcomes. This seems to produce 
better results in areas where actors share similar objectives, best practices are easily 
practiced and cultural sensitivities are low. Hence, this article asserts that soft law on 
its own merits may not be sufficient for Europeanization and that an element of hard 
law is required to ensure optimum outcomes. Therefore, the best solution would be 
to apply a hybrid model. The existence of soft law as the only mechanism for law 
making in the field of EU healthcare is fairly unlikely. Nevertheless, Hervey notes 
that “law and soft modes of health governance are becoming increasingly 
interwoven, thereby opening the door for hybrid EU policy instruments”.2 
 Accordingly, this article will evaluate two proposals that the Organs 
Directive along with the Commission’s Action Plan 2009-2015 can be viewed as a 
form of hybrid governance.3 The Organs Directive is the first legally binding 
supranational risk regulation devised in the field of organ donation and 
transplantation. The Directive is modelled on the earlier Directive dealing with 
blood, tissue and cells. The Action Plan, which is soft law, will complement the 
Directive. The Directive and Action Plan requires additional administration 
procedures from the Member States with the EU Commission regularly monitoring 
the implementation of the work programme to ensure it is manageable for them.  
           Before probing the Directive, the Impact Assessment (IA) undertaken by 
the EU Commission on organ donations, used to determine the rationale behind the 
adoption of the stringent Directive with the Action Plan, will be examined. The 
social, economic and health impacts of the four regulatory options available to the 
Commission will be considered. The Directive and the Action Plan, which are finally 
adopted, will be discussed in detail, before the arguments are placed highlighting the 
fact that the Directive and Action Plan display a mode of hybrid governance. Next, 
the advantages and disadvantages of hybrid governance will be laid out and 
conclusions will be drawn to whether the hybrid model was the best form of action 
in EU healthcare. Lastly, in conclusion, the article will propose the emergence of an 
                                                          
1
 See generally Claudi M. Radaelli, The OMC: A New Governance 
Architecture for the EU? Swedish Institute for Policy Studies 1 (2003).  
 
2
 Tamara Hervey & Bart Vanhercke, Healthcare and the EU: the law and 
policy patchwork, 2 Cambridge University Press 84, 87 (2010). 
 
3
 European Parliament, Council of the European Union, Commission 
Implementing Directive 2012/25/EU laying down information between 
member states of human organs intended for transplantation, 9 October 
2012, 275 Official Journal of the European Union 27 (2012). 
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“integrated model” within the Organs Directive. This is based on the fusion of the 
three governance structures, namely the OMC, comitology and agencies. 
II. EU GOVERNANCE IN ORGANS 
 
 The EU has competence to legislate in the area of organ transplantation. 
Notably, Article 168(4) (a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(“TEFU”) has empowered the Community to take “Measures setting high standards 
of quality and safety of organs and substances of human origin blood and blood 
derivatives.”4  In accordance with Article 168(7) TFEU: ‘The measures referred to in 
paragraph 4(a) shall not affect national provisions on the donation or medical use of 
organs and blood’.5 
 The term ‘national provisions’ highlights the differences in the national 
legal approaches to concerning donor consent.  The term ‘medical use’ refers to 
organ donations for transplantation.6 The sub Article stating ‘The responsibilities of 
the Member States shall include the management of health services and medical care 
and the allocation of the resources assigned to them’ highlights the special status of 
organ transplantation.7 
 The EU Commission justified European-wide action by pointing out that 
unified European action would result in European-wide diversity. The EU 
Commission claimed the advantages of Union action as follows: The EU facilitation 
of consensus-building allowing quicker implementation: economies of scale, lower 
transition costs in establishing the New Quality and Safety system and reduced 
running costs; greater fairness and contribution to solidarity; enhanced donor and 
recipient confidence stemming from legal clarity.8   
     However, it is noted that the requirement for a similar quality and safety 
regime from each EU Member State may require various adjustments to be 
successful at the local hospital level. On the positive side, it would ensure that it if 
quality and standards are standardized at the European level, then it would guarantee 
equal access for all European citizens. The EU Commission’s first publication 
looked at the policy options and set objectives to promote enhanced coordination 
between Member States.9 Here, the EU Commission highlighted that the Community 
needed to react under Article 168(4) (a) TFEU to deal with the challenges facing 
organ transplantation: The transfer of organs can lead to transmission of diseases 
                                                          
4
 See European Commission, Communication From the Commission to the 
European Parliament and the Council Organ Donation and Transplantation: 
Policy actions at EU level, (May 30, 2007). 
 
5
 Id. at 2. 
 
6
 Id. at 3. 
 
7
 Id. at 5.  
 
8
 Id. at 10. 
 
9
  Id. at 6. 
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such as Hepatitis B and C, HIV, various parasites and cancer. Although, there are a 
number of cross-border treatments the legal quality and safety requirements differ 
between Member States. Thus there was a need for the system to a standardisation of 
the system to ensure patients are being protected throughout Europe.10 The EU 
Commission urged that measures needed to be introduced throughout the procedure 
to improve the quality and safety of organs, from pre-transplant evaluation 
procedures set for donors, to setting procedures for procurement and requirements 
for organ preservation and transport.11 A system needed to be in place, which 
allowed donors to be traced in case of complications. National authorities were also 
encouraged to take active roles and establish authorized centres in Europe that would 
monitor safety and quality criteria. The EU Commission concluded that it would 
‘define the precise, balanced scope of the EU legal framework on quality and safety 
for human organs taking in account the dialogue it has had so far with the Member 
States on the issues’.12 
 Due to a shortage of donors, the Commission suggested that the EU 
Member States may be able to create a system by which donors could be identified, 
as after their death donors are lost due to lack of referral, or because the option was 
not presented to their relations.13 If healthcare professionals were trained to identify 
potential donors, donor rates could be increased. Moreover, providing information to 
the healthcare professionals on transplantation may affect the donors’ willingness to 
donate. Eighty-one per cent of Europeans agreed that the use of a donor card would 
facilitate organ donations after their death.14 Given the need to establish adequate 
national transplant systems; good organisational and technical support is essential.15 
The document stated that a “flexible system combining a decentralized network 
formed by local organisations mainly focused on organ procurement, and the 
promotion of donation with large organisations focused on promoting organ sharing 
and cooperation seems to be the most effective organisational approach”.16 This 
                                                          
10
 Id. at 7. 
 
11
  Id. 
 
12
  Id. at 8. 
 
13
 Id. at 9. 
 
14
 C. Sabel & J. Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governances is the European Union. LAFOLLETTE 
SCHOOL WORKING PAPER 1 (2006).  
 
15
 Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council (Mar. 23, 2000). 
 
16
 Commission Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a 
Directive on Standards of Quality and Safety of Human Organs Intended for 
Transplantation and Action Plan on Organ Donation and Transplantation at 
8. COM (2009-2015); See Strengthened Cooperation between Member 
States: Impact Assessment, SEC (2008) at 2956. 
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would give rise to the formation of networks and experimental governance, as 
experimentalist tools such as open consultations would be utilized to achieve the 
goals of promoting organ donation. 
The EU Commission emphasized the need to share best practices among the 
Member States to increase the number of donors and educate health care 
professionals. It would also encourage action at the EU level for the interchange of 
organs between national levels.17 The EU Commission also proposed an Action Plan 
that would include qualitative, and quantative indicators, and regular reporting in 
order to promote greater coordination. It restated the preference for the use of the 
OMC type methodology utilising the Directly Deliberative Polyarchy theory (so 
called DDP theory) and signalled the shift away from the traditional command and 
control mechanisms of governance used in blood and to a lesser extent, in tissues 
and cells regulation.18 Thereafter the EU Commission conducted a series of meetings 
with stakeholders and experts to receive feedback on the proposed Action Plan, as 
well as input on the drafting of the proposal for a Directive in this area. The adoption 
of the OMC within this area raised issues with certain stakeholders, who felt that this 
method would divert personnel and resources away from the actual strategies and 
thus was unnecessary. 19 It was also felt that there was a greater need for flexibility to 
                                                          
 
17
 Commission of the European Parliament and the Council:” Organ 
donation and transplantation: policy actions at the EU level - Summary of 
the Impact Assessment. SEC (2007) 704; Commission of The European 
Communities for a Strategy for Europe on Nutrition. Overweight and Obesity 
related health issues. COM (2007) 279 final (May 30, 2007); See supra note 
4. 
 
18
 C. Sabel & J. Zeitlin, Learning from Difference: Experimentalist 
Governance in the European Union 2, Oxford Univ. Press (2010). The 
theory of (directly deliberative polyarchy (DDP) emphasises direct 
participation, deliberation and concrete problem solving. Sabel and Zeitlin 
argue that the OMC expresses the essence of DDP. It is directly deliberative 
because allows actors with direct field experience to bring about different 
reactions and open new possibilities. It is polyarchic, because it is a system, 
which allows local units to learn discipline and set goals for each other.  
 
19
 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying Document to the 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council Organ Donation and Transplantation: Policy Actions at EU Level 
Impact Assessment. SEC (2007) (May 30, 2007). The Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) was defined by the Portuguese Presidency at Lisbon, 
and afterwards in terms closely modelled on the European Employment 
Strategy as involving a specific ensemble of elements: Fixing guidelines for 
the Union combined with specific timetables for achieving the goals that they 
set in the short, medium and long term; Establishing, where appropriate, 
quantative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks against the best in the 
world and tailored to the needs of different Member States and sectors as a 
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be built into any EU regulation regime. This meant that clinicians and patients 
needed to be granted adequate freedoms to make decisions about associated risks of 
the use organ transplantation, given factors such as waiting lists and organ 
shortage.20    
 In reaction to stakeholders’ participation in organ donation and 
transplantation policies, DG Sanco launched an open consultation in 2006. The 
Commission received 73 contributions from regulators, medical and patient 
organisations and created a key stakeholder group from around 16 European 
Associations.21 The group met in 2008 and shared information, which was then 
incorporated within the definitions of the policy options. The EU Commission since 
2007 has held various meetings with national experts of all Member States, 
including Eurotransplant and Scandiatransplant, and discussed key priorities.22  
 Arguably, the EU Commission’s interactions with the stakeholders and 
experts for feedback, along with its efforts to bring together the actors to reflect on 
the current issues of organ donations and develop legislation through networks, 
highlighted Zeitlin’s network deliberative decision-making concept.23 The theory 
purports a shift away from the ideals of representative democracy in which laws are 
only perceived to be legitimate if the electorate formulates them. Informal 
deliberation is not conceived from the technical elites but rather through a multitude 
of actors. This was particularly true as at this stage options for regulation were 
considered but it was not necessarily assumed at the outset that hard law would be 
utilized.24 
 At the time of the Impact Assessment (IA), it was recognized that 25 out of 
the 29 countries (EU, Turkey and Norway) surveyed had a national register, which 
contained the data on the origin and destination of the organs.25 Only eight countries 
                                                          
means of comparing best practices; Translating these European guidelines in 
to national and regional policies by setting specific targets and adopting 
measures, taking into account national and regional differences; Periodic 
monitoring, evaluation and peer review organized as mutual learning 
processes. 
 
20
 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Standards of 
Quality and Safety of Human Organs Intended for Transplantation and the 
Communication from the Commission Action Plan on Organ Donation and 
Transplantation (2009-2015): Strengthened Cooperation Between Member 
States, SEC (2008) 2956. 
 
21
 Id. 
 
22
 Id. at 3. 
 
23
 See Sabel & Zeitlin, supra note 14. 
 
24
 Id. 
25
 See European Commission, supra note 4.    
 
124 CLEVELAND-MARSHALL JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH     (Vol. 31:1) 
 
 
made reporting adverse conditions compulsory. Once a disease is found in the 
recipient, there is an urgent need to trace the donor to prevent the disease. However, 
there was no system that would allow the tracing in cross-border cases, despite more 
than 4000 organs being exchanged between Member States annually.26 Organs will 
inevitably be related to cells and tissues. It is therefore vital that information about 
adverse effects and infections in a solid organ transplant can be quickly traced to a 
donor and immediately relayed to the tissue vigilance system, which is foreseen by 
the European tissue and cell directive.27 
 In the IA, DG Sanco identified four regulatory approaches in the area of 
organ donation and transplantation, which were devised through experimental 
methods.28 The first option involved the EU Commission continuing to take actions 
such as its previous involvement in research programs and international 
cooperation.29 The second option involved a non-regulatory approach by developing 
a European Action Plan on Organ Donation and Transplantation for the period 2009-
2015. The third option involved the combination of an Action Plan, similarly to 
option 2, along with a ‘flexible directive.’ The fourth option involved the 
combination of an Action Plan with a stringent directive. This directive will be 
modelled on the Tissue and Cells Directive and thus contain detailed regulation 
about safety and quality of care needed to be enforced within the Member States.30  
  These options were assessed via a number of methods.31 The first point of 
analysis of impact was a literature review. Secondly, country studies were reviewed 
in relation to six sample countries. Thirdly, interviews taken of stakeholders were 
conducted including with national and general experts in the field of organ donation. 
Fourthly, in order to examine the improvements four scenarios of different changes 
in living and deceased donation rates were developed, which were used to identify 
the economic and health impacts of the proposals. Fifthly, a cost consequence 
framework in the form of an impact matrix was used to analyse the evidence, 
identify the key impacts and compare them across the four options.32   
 All policy options were likely to increase donation rates. According to the 
IA, the best scenario would see approximately 21,000 organ transplantation 
operations per year saving 230,000 lives.33 The IA suggested that options 2 and 4 
                                                          
 
26
 Id.  
 
27
 See European Commission, supra note 16 at 15. 
 
28
 Id. 
 
29
 Id. at 3.  
 
30
 Id. 
 
31
 Id. at 4.  
 
32
 See European Commission, supra note 4 at 5. 
33
 Id. at 4. 
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could lead to better economic benefits. However, the Member States needed to 
invest to improve the national infrastructure in this field. The evidence shows that 
organ transplantation allows patients to participate in social and working life. Option 
3 was considered the best option to reconcile the objectives with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. A flexible Directive combined with an Action Plan 
would allow the decision-making process to be distributed, thereby including actors 
at the hospitals, EU Member States and European levels.  
 Different scenarios were used to establish the likely results that could be 
achieved from the different policy options. The reasoning is as follows:34 
 
Proposals usually depend on national transplant systems. There is often a lack of 
clarity between policy outcome and actual impacts. 
The multilevel governance approach in organ transplantation creates uncertainty 
in outcomes. The improvements to organ transplantation procedures are delivered in 
hospitals. As option 2 and 3 allow voluntary action, it is questionable how much of 
the European procedures would enter hospital systems. 
The Spanish model was used as a comparator to assess potential impacts. It is the 
best example to illustrate that organ donation and procurement can increase and 
sustain organ donation rates. 
The results of this comparison showed that option 3 and option 4 contained the 
most elements for success of the Spanish model. 
The Spanish comparator was used as to produce the ideal results.  The 
assumption was that if the Member States were to fully implement the European 
options then they achieve the Spanish results. 
The IA realized that these were optimistic results, therefore three other scenarios 
were utilized: All countries achieve at least European average transplantation rate; 
all countries improve transplantation rate by 10%; and all countries improve 
transplantation rate by 30%.35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34
 Id. 
 
35
 See Commission Working Document Accompanying the Proposal for a 
Directive on Standards of Quality and Safety of Human Organs Intended for 
Transplantation and Action Plan on Organ Donation and Transplantation, 
supra note 16 at 60.  
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      Table 1 below will show that the policy options need to adhere to the 
commitment/capacity that the EU Member States are willing to submit to. 
 
Table 1 Scenario and policy options.36 
 
Element Option 1 Option 2 
Action 
Plan (AP) 
Option 3 
AP 
and 
Flexible 
Directive 
Option 4 
AP and 
Stringent 
Directive 
Low 
commitment/capacity 
Member States 
No change No 
increase 
Average 
increase 
scenarios 
2 and 4 
Average 
increase 
scenarios 2 
and 4 
High 
commitment/capacity 
of Member States 
No change High 
increase 
scenarios 
1 and 3 
High 
increase 
scenarios 
1 and 3 
High increase 
scenarios 1 
and 3 
  
 
Options 3 and 4 make compulsory changes. Thus, the results are more visible 
than in option 2. If the options had been compared with the Spanish model, then 
there would be no increase in organ donation rates under option 1. Option 2 would 
lead to an increase if EU Member States were willing to implement the Action Plans.  
However, if there is no commitment from an EU Member State then not much can 
be expected in relation to results. The results under options 3 and 4 are more positive 
as they enforce mandatory national implementation. The problem with option 4 is 
that with the stringent directive in place it may make organisations become reluctant 
to participate in organ procurement and result in reduced organ donation rates.   
 If the policy options are benchmarked against the Spanish model, then it 
can be seen that all options would promote the role of transplant donor coordinators 
(TDCs) in hospitals. They promote public awareness by improving the knowledge of 
health professionals and patient groups. Options 3 and 4 demand legal mandates, the 
establishment of programs and systems and training. The problems remain with the 
implementation as the Member States have a lower discretion within options 3 and 4. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 below outlines the options in accordance with their health, social and EU 
impact budgets.37 
                                                          
36
 Id. at 63. 
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Option 
 
Health impacts 
 
Social Impacts 
 
EU Budgetary impacts 
Option 1 
No change  
 
No change 
expected to 
address the current 
shortage in organ 
donations. 
 
 
- No change in 
Quality of 
life and 
social 
participation 
/employment 
of 
donor/recipi
ents 
 
- Varied trust and 
confidence 
in the 
transplant 
system 
across 
Member   
States. 
 
 
- -No extra costs 
involved in 
setting up 
national 
infrastructures
/registers or 
traceability 
systems.  
- –High long term 
treatment 
costs and loss 
of 
productivity 
due to 
increased 
waiting times. 
                                                          
37
 Id. at 71-3. 
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Option 2 
AP 
Donation rate: 
From 0-7,908-
21,006 organs 
expected 
depending on the 
commitment of the 
Member State. 
-Lower 
predictions show 
no change, higher 
show 231,006 life 
years saved. 
 
-Knowledge 
will increase living 
donors. 
-Definite 
benefits to small 
Member States due 
to improved 
processes and 
removal of 
barriers. 
-Improved care for 
donors/higher number 
of transplantation 
therefore better quality 
of care. 
 
-Does not address 
obstacles to social 
participation and 
employment for 
individuals. There 
would be some 
increase in social 
participation due to the 
increase in 
transplanted organs. 
  
-Public awareness 
and better training of 
transplant coordinators 
might increase 
confidence of donor 
families.  
-Low to medium 
costs for voluntary 
measures to designate 
accredit establishments 
and more transplant 
coordinators. 
 -Saving costs 
through standardized 
reporting of medical 
information. 
-Low costs for 
reporting requirements 
under the OMC.  
-Savings in 
treatment costs if 
Member States commit 
properly then up to 1.2 
billion Euros. 
-Productivity 
Impact: 
2.4 billion if 
Member State 
commitment is low. 
-Economic impact 
on living donor: 
Reduced economic 
risks to health care. 
Option 3 
 
Flexible 
Directive and 
AP 
-Donor rate: 
medium to high. 
Between 54,320-
231,006 life years 
saved in the upper 
range. 
 
  
-Common quality 
and safety 
standards would 
supplement the AP 
and increase organ 
donation. 
-Legally prescribed, 
better access to care 
for living donors 
 
-Social participation 
and employment: 
Same as option2. 
 
-Better training plus 
quality and safety 
standards may increase 
patient safety and 
empower patients. 
- Medium costs for 
running national quality 
systems. 
Very low costs to 
setting competent 
authorities.  
Low to medium costs 
for designating or 
authorising 
establishments. 
-Low/medium costs for 
adapting national 
traceability and adverse 
reporting systems.   
-Low costs of reporting 
of activities at 
transplantation centres. 
-Treatment of costs: 
Savings of 1.2 billion 
Euros at the best. 
-Productivity: 
882 billion Euros as a 
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result of modest 
increase in donations. 
-Economic Impacts on 
living donor: 
Same as option 2 
Option 4 
 
Stringent 
Directive and 
AP 
-Donor rate: 
Medium to high 
Same results as 
option 3 for life 
years saved. 
-Living Donors: 
Same as option3 
-Cross Border 
exchange: 
Same as option 3. 
-Quality of care: 
Same as option3.  
 
-Social participation 
and employment: 
Same as option 2.  
-Trust and Confidence 
in transplantation: 
Same as option3. 
 
 
-Medium/High costs for 
national legal quality 
systems - hospital level. 
-Low costs for 
establishing a national 
register of 
establishments. High 
costs for introduction to 
European standardized 
traceability systems. 
-Reporting obligations 
and administrative 
burden: 
Same as option3. 
Treatment costs: 
Same as option 3 
Productivity: 
Same as option3. 
Economic Impact: 
Same as option 2. 
 
Table 2 above illustrates that in terms of health impacts, the options will increase 
donation rates. The options will increase cross border exchange of organs, which 
will facilitate the health of urgent patients and the most vulnerable patients (i.e. 
children/highly sensitized). There is a degree of uncertainty with the results 
anticipated with option 2 because these are dependent on the discretion of the 
Member State’s implementation. Options 3 and 4 present the highest health benefits. 
 In terms of social impacts, the table above also points out that the patients 
will have improved social lives with transplantations. European action will further 
allow patient trust to grow within the systems; the highest social benefits again arise 
from options 3 and 4. From a theoretical lens it can be observed that option 3 and 4 
have the greatest social and health impacts as combing the Directive with the Action 
Plan allowing for the integration of the new governance and traditional law 
instruments. This in turn provides the maximum benefits from traditional methods 
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and new governance which is termed ‘transformation’ by Trubek and Trubek, who 
state that ‘the introduction of new governance may be a part of the conscious design 
to get the best of the old and the new, by yoking the two together in an integrated 
process’.38    
 Looking at the situation from an economic perspective, options 2 and 4 
could potentially process the greatest economic benefits.  Member States need to 
invest in the national infrastructure of organ donation to realise these gains. Option 3 
involves costs, attached to it, as it requires a national vigilance system with national 
registers. However, as this would be mandatory it would save costs. The same is true 
for option 4, yet this option carries higher implementation costs; Member States 
have less choice to revise their existing national systems. 
        In option 2 the adoption of the Action Plan will be based on the cooperation 
of the EU Member States through the national action plans. The Public Health 
Programme retains the resources with the responsibility to coordinate in this field. 
Option 4 entails the adoption of the stringent directive, which will be modelled under 
the Tissue Directive. This will require further detailed meetings and even more 
comitology meetings resulting in further costs to the start-up procedure. It is argued 
that the Commission could reduce costs incurred by the EU Member States utilise 
the existing work by the Council of Europe to avoid the duplicating research by 
experts especially in areas of data sharing, as better use should be made of the 
“epistemic community” of experts that are present within the area of organ 
research.39 
 
III. ACTION PLAN (2009-2015) AND ORGANS DIRECTIVE.40 
 
This section aims to provide an outline of the contents of the Action Plan and the 
directive. 
 
 3.1 The Action Plan 
 
As discussed above, the Commission published a further Communication in 2008 
along with the proposed directive. The Communication contained the revised Action 
Plan. 41 The Plan is designed to cover the work program in the field of organ 
transplantation in 2009-2015.42 Ten priorities were identified to address the current 
                                                          
38
 D. Trubek, and L. Trubek,  New Governance and Legal Regulation: 
Complementarity, Rivalry and Transformation Narrowing the Gap: Law and 
New Approaches in the EU, Columbia Journal of European Law 13 (2006-
2007).   
39
 P. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic, Communities and International Policy 
Coordination. International Organization 46 (1), (1992). 
 
40
 Id. 
 
41
 See Strengthened Cooperation between Member States, supra note 16. 
 
42
 Id. 
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problem to enhance the quality and safety of organs, as well as the efficiency and 
accessibility of organ transplantations.43 The OMC was used to set the plan to 
identify common objectives; set targets/indicators/benchmarking and Member States 
would have the independence to achieve the outlined objectives. 
 
 The following table will summarise the strategies under the 10 priorities: 
 
 Priority. Strategies under the priority. 
 P1 Priorities 1-5 deal with organ 
availability.  
The ultimate aim is to increase organ 
procurement from deceased donors. 
Appointment of transplant donor co-
ordinators like the Spanish system. To 
ensure uniformity in training these co-
ordinators work will be done by following 
international standards.44  
P 2 Development of agreed indicators and 
best practices for quality improvement 
programs at national level. Specialists in 
intensive care and the transplant co-
ordinators will do this.45 
P3 Enhancing living donation especially 
for kidneys. 
P4 Increasing public awareness (through 
media) in relation to organ donation. 
P5 Develop mechanisms to facilitate the 
identification of cross border donors. 
P6-9 An organisational model needs to be 
developed to enhance organ procurement. 
The Spanish Model the model will be 
followed. This will involve setting up a 
central coordinating administrative 
agency, a transplant network that will 
operate nationally/regionally, promotion 
campaigns and audits on organ 
transplantation. 
Promotion of cross border exchange of 
organs. 
P10 Promote common accreditation system 
for transplant/organ donation. 
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The 2007 EU Commission Communication recognized that organ donation and 
the transplantation regulatory framework would need to be flexible, but would 
provide a basic quality and safety framework.46  It would follow a similar format to 
the Blood and Tissues Directive taking in account the specific issues in organ 
donation and transplantation. As mentioned before, concerns were expressed that if 
the Directive were too rigid, then it would create too many administrative burdens at 
national levels and create obstacles.   
 The Organs Directive was adopted, and the EU Member States transposed it 
into national laws for 27 August 2012.47 The Directive is divided into chapters 
containing: 
- Subject matter, scope and definition; 
- Quality and safety standards for organs; 
- Donor and recipient protection for donor selection and evaluation; 
- Obligations of competent authorities and exchange of information; 
- Organ exchange with third countries and European organ exchange 
organisations; 
- General and final provisions. 
The key provisions of the Directive allow the EU Member States to establish a 
framework which would include procedures for identifying the donor, the consent of 
the donor (or family consent), set a system for traceability of organs, reporting 
mechanism for serious adverse events and reactions.48 
       The procedure of organ exchange between EU Member States requires a 
system to ensure that the traceability, quality and safety conditions are met including 
the safety of potential recipients.49 This system was put in place for the protection of 
donors and donees alike.50 Farrell comments that the legally binding part of the 
Directive does not further ‘elaborate’ on the allocation criteria.51 In paragraph 20 of 
the Recital it is verified that the allocation of organs should be based on scientific, 
non-discriminatory and transparent criteria.52 The Commission, in the 
implementation of the Action Plan, should take these sets of criteria into account. 
Similarly, the Directive ensures that organ procurement takes place appropriately. 
The Member States need to ensure that they can provide information on the 
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authorization of such bodies.53 They need to ensure that suitable equipment; 
materials and surgical facilities are used during procurement.54 
             Chapter III of the Directive deals with the requirements with the donor 
and recipient protection including donor selection and evaluation. The consent 
regime at the national level will be respected and procurement will occur after the 
laws have been observed.55 Member States need to ensure that organ donation is 
conducted on a non-profit basis.56For living donors the assessments are required by 
trained and competent professionals. Member States are required to ensure the 
highest protection of living donors to secure quality and safety of organs for 
transplantation.57 It is acknowledged that there is a need for further guidelines in 
relation to the circumstances where living organ donation can take place, and precise 
listings for the type of protection that will be provided to the living donor. Donations 
can be refused on grounds of unacceptable health risks.58   
 
IV.    IS NEW GOVERNANCE THE RIGHT WAY FORWARD IN THE ORGANS CASE? 
 
Whether the Action Plan (which is the soft law portion of the legislation) will 
achieve its aims seems questionable. At a national level, it has raised concerns that it 
will increase the administrative burdens on the on national institutions in order for 
them to fulfil their obligations under the Directive and Action Plan. The experts’ 
meeting overlooked by the Commission concluded that the ten priorities are 
substantive and will require planning and evaluation overtime.59 
       The attraction to soft law is that it could easily become hard law. For 
instance, the legal effects are created by the expectations laid down in the soft law 
provisions. The soft law will then be incorporated in to hard law provisions as in this 
instance the Action Plan will complement the Organs Directive. Finally, the 
Commission’s role to cooperate with non-state actors at national levels produces 
legal effects for soft law provisions. 
       One of the reasons new governance may seem attractive is because the CJEU 
has also regarded the outcomes of new governance as part of the acquis 
communautaire. It has been established through the CJEU’s case law that the 
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national courts need to take recommendations into account even though they are not 
binding under Article 288(5) TFEU.60 The Court has limited the EU institutions’ 
discretion to depart from the soft law instruments, as the institutions may be in 
breach of general principles of law.61 Klabbers further affirms that the moment soft 
law is applied within judicial/non judicial circumstances; the concept collapses either 
entirely or becomes hard law or no law whatsoever.62 Member States will also be 
obliged to accept the soft law if they have participated in the drafting procedure of 
the recommendations.63 
            However, new governance mechanisms rely on the input of a variety of 
actors in law-making thereby enhancing the democratic legitimacy of outputs. For 
instance, under Article 155 TFEU (ex Article 139 EC), an agreement concluded 
between the social partners can be “implemented by the (signatories) in accordance 
with the procedures and practices specific to management and labour in the EU 
Member States.”64 Implementation also takes place via a Council decision in which 
the Council issues a Directive, which is referring to the agreement management and 
labour in the EU Member States and also via a Council decision in which the 
Council issues a Directive that refers to the agreement between the social partners. 
Notably, EU Member States do not need to apply the agreements reached by the 
social partners which are not adopted, as this represents soft law for EU Member 
States.65 There is some uncertainty regarding the legal status of the agreements 
informally concluded by social partners. Betten comments that they “do not have 
another legal status other than that of an agreement between two parties falling 
outside the scope of Community law”.66 Furthermore it can be argued that non-state 
actors could assist the Commission in relation to the implementation of the soft 
policy coordination instruments, in particular the OMC. The stakeholders could 
monitor the national measures that are in place for the OMC enforcement. The 
effectiveness of this type of supervision will be based on the conduct of the national 
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administration. Nevertheless, the Commission does not have sufficient material 
resources or legal basis to monitor the Member States in the implementation of the 
OMC.67 
         Lobel highlights that the governance model will supersede the classic 
regulatory model as the former “addresses the changes in both the goals and 
capabilities of legal regulation, and avoids the central deficiencies of substantive 
law.68 [It] fundamentally transforms legal control into a dynamic, reflexive and 
flexible regime.” This has led to the need for change in aspirations of law and policy. 
However, there is scope to improve new governance the question remains should it 
be applied to the organs case?  
 
V.   HYBRID FORM OF REGULATION AND THE CASE OF THE ORGANS DIRECTIVE  
 
As mentioned above, new governance has its limitations. Democratic 
accountability is only guaranteed if the decision-making outputs of the new modes 
are subject to control by elected governmental actors who are elected through 
democratically legitimate policy-making procedures under a representative 
government. Stakeholder democracy, which is the most frequently used under new 
the modes of governance, does not allow control for the negative external effects of 
functionally delimited new modes of governance. Due to the obvious deficiencies 
related with soft law, EU healthcare governance could benefit from the 
transformation of old and new governance, where the new governance and 
traditional law are put together in an integrated system. Each form of governance 
relies on the other for its success. This method views the hybrid of old and new 
governance. 
        In the light of the discussion so far, this article contends that the Action Plan 
with the Organ Directive may also be seen as hybrid governance. The Directive may 
constitute hard law whilst the Action Plan would be seen as the soft law mechanism. 
The hybrid package combines both the hard law and soft law instruments. Harder 
instruments lend force to the softer instruments. Hybrid governance is linked to 
Hervey and Trubek’s suggestion for a ‘Transformative Directive’ in the field of 
cross-border healthcare.69 They suggested that both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ could be 
harnessed together to develop a hybrid structure. This would ensure the benefits of 
experimentalism without retreating entirely beyond the legal constraints.70 For 
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instance, Trubek and Hervey proposed a hybrid solution in the form of a 
‘Transformative Directive’ as they justified it as “much to offer in terms of 
developing and circulating solutions to the problems arising from managing 
healthcare provision in the context of an internal market and Europe’s social 
model”.71 The internal market needs to be taken into account (which is 
predominantly treaty based) within the field of cross-border healthcare.72 Thus a 
hybrid structure may seem more appropriate as it could take into account the 
classical methods and new methods of governance. Sabel and Zeitlin view the 
Directive to set the parameters and establish transparency and accountability via 
DDP.73 The Directive creates obligations for accountability and hence allows 
participation in the context of soft law.74 This allows for a new architecture of EU 
governance that operates through a hybrid mixture of soft and hard law. 
           Moreover, Trubek and Hervey suggest that this ‘Transformative 
Directive’ would comprise of two parts.75 The first part would consist of hard law, 
which would take the form of a Directive. Its preamble would reflect the European 
social model. It would deal with the legal provisions on cross border healthcare and 
healthcare services. The second part of the ‘Transformative Directive’ would form 
new governance institutions, which would create legal rules by utilising soft law 
through iterative participatory processes. This would then result in a Strategy, which 
would allow coordination from EU Member States and the Commission. Such a 
Strategy would focus on the exchange of information, develop guidance, 
participation of stakeholders and peer review, which are essentials in new 
governance and are envisaged for the OMC in healthcare and long-term care.76 In the 
spirit of the hybrid governance structure the Transformative Directive would 
regulate the standards for the Strategy (the soft law). It would promote procedural 
duties including accountability and transparency, and demanding the methods of the 
strategy to be transparent. The Directive would contain requirements for the Strategy 
to contain guidelines for the dealing with cross border care.77 An example of hybrid 
governance is shown in The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, which 
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incorporates codes of conduct to make them binding. The Directive transforms the 
voluntary codes to make them binding on traders.78       
         There are examples of hybrid governance in environmental protection.  
Notably Directive 2008/1/EC on integrated pollution prevention and control (the 
IPPC directive) requires that the permit can only be obtained if environmental 
obligations are complied with.79 The obligations must be based on Best Available 
Techniques (BAT). The Commission deals with the BAT exchange of information. 
The Member States and stakeholders establish the BAT reference documents 
(BREFs). The Commission then provides the publication of the BAT reference 
documents. The BAT documents are non-binding and offer details to relevant bodies 
on BAT based permit conditions. The BAT reference documents are highly 
influential. The Commission, in its proposal for an IPPC Directive, noted that there 
were gaps in the BAT and laid down provisions to clarify the use of BAT. In 
particular Article 3 of the proposal which requires Member States to “take the 
necessary measures to provide that the competent authorities ensure that installations 
are operated in such a way that: a) all the appropriate preventative measures are 
taken against pollution, in particular through application of the BAT,” may give the 
Commission with legal authority it needs to limit national discretion in 
implementation. 80  
             The Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (EIA) and the Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) are described as instances in which law is transformed 
by its relationship with new governance.81 The EIA Directive provides tools for 
evaluation and adaptation allowing regular exchange between the Commission and 
the Member States.82 The Commission must issue implementation reports that 
provide any proposed amendments to the EIA Directive to ensure it is utilized an 
appropriate manner.83 The WFD has devised an informal governance forum in the 
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form of the Common Implementation Strategy, which allows for the open 
coordination between the Member States and the Commission in the implementation 
of the Directive.84             
          Moreover, Velluti argues that ‘a strong hybridized system of co-regulation 
could also reduce the putative weakness of new governance’ for its lack in 
accountability and judicial scrutiny.85 The problems lie in the fact that law and 
constitutionalism are linked to ‘stateness’ which are not found in new governance 
processes.86 The solutions seem to lie with trying to establish the use of hybridity as 
effective regulatory model.  Hybridity aims to develop an interconnection of the 
adjudication, legislation, implementation, and enforcement stages instead of seeing 
them as singular processes. The first stages could begin with trying to develop a 
model of regulation, which is sensitive to the realities in the EU system. The 
hybridity models would allow the EU to coexist within a multi-tiered structure but 
also require the need to strike a balance to ensure economic efficiency, democracy 
and accountability. 
       It is envisaged that the Organs Directive and Action Plan could be modelled 
with this Transformation Directive. The ten priorities of the Action Plan (soft law 
element) deal with benchmarking, the development of indicators and best practices. 
The Directive (hard law element) covers the scope of the Directive, definitions, 
procedures for consent, and quality and safety of the organs. The Directive sets out 
the framework and the legal duties for the Action Plan to operate within. These 
include placing the duty on the Member States to set National Quality Programs, 
which will include the rules on the operating procedures and traceability of the 
organs.87 The institutional requirements under the Directive are firstly, the Member 
States being required to designate tasks to a competent authority, whose role will 
involve ensuring that the procurement centres and transplantation centres are audited 
regularly, and may suspend the centres that do not comply with the requirements of 
the Directive.88 Secondly, the Directive requires the establishment of a Committee on 
organ transplantation, which will provide the Commission with assistance.89 The 
procedural requirements of the Directive include the requirement for the National 
quality programs to provide procedures to verify donors, or donor’s family consent 
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in accordance to the national rules.90 There need to be procedures in place for the 
reporting obligations to trace donors and allow for procurement and traceability.91 
        Following Scott and Holder’s conceptual framework on new governance’s 
outcomes, the Action Plan would operate on a three-fold basis: It would provide the 
platform for production and exchange of data, secondly it would establish guidance 
and thirdly it would commit to reviewing, testing and validating the current 
practices.92  The exchange and production of data are essential in the new 
governance procedure because without the data there are no grounds for testing the 
national practices.  
Similarly to the Environmental Assessment Directive, the OMC type procedures 
will establish and devise benchmarks, indicators to mechanisms for reporting in 
order to test and validate national procedures.93 This is visible through Priority 
Action 2, which requires the Transplant Donor Coordinators (TDCs) in hospitals to 
identify best practices (to increase organ availability) for deliberation among the 
Member States with training being provided on all aspects of organ donations. 
Priority 2 aims for the Member States to develop indicators to improve programs at 
the national level. Priority 3 furthers this ambition by devising programs to promote 
organ donation and creating national registers to hold data on the donors.  
          The role of these programs is to contribute to best practices. The 
establishment of guidance would be possible through Priority Action 4, which 
requires regular meetings with stakeholders, journalists, national experts and patient 
support groups to devise strategies to increase organ availability. Finally, current 
practices would be reviewed, tested and validated through peer-reviews. This will be 
possible through the use of Priorities 6-9, which focus on identifying efficient 
practices and improving national models. This is made possible through peers-
reviews and utilising the information from the transplant network coordinators.  
Moreover, it can be argued that the DDP theory would also apply to the Organs 
case as the experimentalist tools such as the indicators and benchmarks utilized in 
the Action Plan will be subject to peer-reviews. Whilst the network coordination 
between the TDCs, various support groups, and the committees operating both 
nationally and on an EU level all demonstrate direct deliberation.    
Yet, the problem with the Action Plan is that it seems overly ambitious in its 
scope and coverage. Thus, it seems questionable whether or not it will be achieved. 
The same national bodies that are working on the priorities of the Action Plan will 
be responsible for implementation of the Directive. They face additional burdens to 
meet the requirements under the Directive and Action Plan. The substantive aspects 
of the Action Plan require detailed planning for the implementation and evaluation. 
There are the concerns raised by the national representatives on how the OMC will 
be utilized under the work programs of the Action Plan.  
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The Commission has preferred the use of the OMC for the development of the 
expert consensus on indicators and best practices.94 Again, the fear is that it may 
result in negotiations between technocratic elites and there needs be an assurance 
that patient interests are adequately represented. There needs to be peer-reviewing of 
the indicators and best practices by all sections of society to ensure dynamic 
accountability. Also, the hybrid Organs Directive and the Action Plan package may 
have the opportunity to uphold certain constitutional and substantive values. 
Regarding procedural values, transparency could be achieved if the operating 
procedures of the National programs are visible; if the minutes and audits of the 
Transplantation Centers are available and if the reports and registers are accessible.95 
Participation would be required from the necessary stakeholders compromising the 
necessary patient rights groups, and healthcare professionals. In relation to 
substantive principles, all the actors involved the process would be required to 
respect principles such as equality, and solidarity.96   
       One of the issues regarding accountability would be to determine the 
mechanisms for the actors involved. Accountability needs to be ensured by external 
bodies, which would give judgements.97 The best option would be peer-reviews in 
order to review the decisions taken through dynamic accountability. Another 
objection, as Smisman states is the fact that participation does not imply that all 
stakeholders are involved, risking it a semi closed network.98 
        It is also important to consider that the EU’s legal order seems to be about 
economic order and not about social-protection policy. Scharpf argues that the OMC 
is a response to constitutional imbalance between the both.99 However, it is argued 
that the Directive would balance the health interests of patients and strengthen the 
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OMC by bringing it within the scope of the internal market. It seems likely however, 
that the Directive will enhance individual rights as patients waiting for organs would 
be better informed due to priority 4 which promotes greater public awareness or at 
least care teams/hospitals would have the facilities to gain information. 
 
 
 
VI. PROPOSAL OF THE INTEGRATED MODEL: A FUSION OF THE THREE GOVERNANCE 
STRUCTURES 
 
Following the discussion on hybrid governance through the Organs Directive and 
Action Plan the paper proposes that the Organs Directive (Action Plan) illustrates an 
‘integrated model’ of governance combining elements of the three forms of 
governance structures namely the agencies, comitology and the OMC in a coherent 
manner. This may be considered as a possible model for the EU’s governance 
dimension reflecting the hybrid character of the Union. This is possible because the 
Organs Directive is a risk regulating structure, which reflects the general 
transformation of society away from danger to a risk producing structure, as the 
procedures relating to organs carry risks.  
          Such comitology structures serve as instruments that increase reflexivity as 
they institutionalise forms of mutual observations and information sharing between 
Member States. Partly due to the legal framing of comitology these structures tend, 
moreover to be more stable and dense compared to the OMC processes. The 
committees deal with complex and technical matters. Comitology also serves to 
ensure implementation. It provides EU Member States with a stake of the 
implementation of EU legislation. Comitology is based on soft power and 
persuasion, which in the absence of the necessary competencies and resources serve 
as functional equivalents to traditional demand and control mechanisms. The 
comitology machinery is aimed towards the Commission’s efforts to ensure 
compliance with EU legislation thus reducing the structural deficit of the EU as 
regards the implementation and compliance mechanisms. 
           Earlier considerations made in this article highlighted that agencies tend to 
be networked; they are established in complex areas in which it is hard for the 
Commission to ensure the stability of networks. Therefore, the secretarial and 
networking coordination roles have been delegated to agencies that act like mini 
Commissions. Their intrinsic lack of discretionary competencies, limits their role to 
generating information and monitoring network coordination. The role of initiating 
and developing policies has remained largely with the Commission. Networks seem 
to fulfil the same function in policy areas as the agencies because the Commission 
also dominates them. Networks and agencies have similar roles in the areas 
dominated by the comitology as they operate to link hierarchical organisations, 
Commission, agencies and the Member State administrations, thereby ensuring that 
these organisations are embedded within the broader social realm. 
         It follows from the above discussion that governance structures can be 
defined as institutional formations relying on the network form and characterized by 
organisational and legal hierarchy, which act as structural couplings between 
hierarchically organized organisations, increasing the reflexive capacities of the 
organisations in question and thereby offsetting the structural deficits of one or more 
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of those organisations. In addition, and especially in those areas where agencies have 
emerged, Teubner’s distinction between networks and hybrids gains renewed 
relevance.100 Whereas the OMC processes can be understood as pure networks, 
which merely link organisations, especially in the more mature areas, especially 
those where the agencies have emerged and are increasingly characterized by 
governance structures which go beyond networks. Such hybrids combine 
hierarchical models of organisation with heterarchical structures such as Comitology 
and OMC instruments developing an ‘integrated model’ of governance which 
includes elements from all three forms of the governance structures (namely 
agencies, comitology and the OMC). 
        Evidently, this article seeks to demonstrate the combination of the three 
modes of governance (comitology, agencies and OMC) that are integrated and 
operate within the Directive. The OMC as an operational mode of governance is 
visible in Priority 2. It aims to promote quality improvement programs in order to 
increase organ availability and is thus required to locate best practices. In addition, 
priority 6 also seeks to encourage Member States to develop and constantly improve 
their national models, they will be in turn assisted through the provisions of peer-
reviews set by the EU together these actions emulate the OMC type processes. 101 
The use of comitology as a governance structure is evident through Priorities 6-9, 
which provide the scope for utilising the committee structures that would replicate 
the EU type comitology structure. The Commission will be able to gain access to the 
services of the expert advisory committee of the Council of Europe as it will be able 
draw on the previous work of the Council of Europe including setting up a 
coordination network which requires a committee like structure for the interaction of 
different actors both public and private.102 In addition, Article 26 of the Directive 
also requires the establishment of committee structure as it allows for the 
Commission to be provided assistance from the Committee on Organ 
transplantation.  
      The need for an administrative agency is also visible in Article 10 of the 
Directive, which requires the formation of competent authorities that would process 
data.  It is suggested that a full functioning EU administrative agency could be 
created. This agency would possess the status of a quasi-regulatory agency, which 
would fall short of Majone’s ideal of fully independent agency. It would carry out 
                                                          
100
 P. Kjaer, Between Governing and Governance: On the Emergence, 
Function and Form of Europe’s Post Constellation Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
(2010) at 154.  
101
 P. Kjaer, Systems in Context: On the Outcome of the Habermas/Luhman 
Debate, ANCILLA JURIS (2006) 66 at 70. OMC processes act as a specific 
form of structural coupling working to eliminate the lack of cognitive 
resources. OMC networks in effect linking Member State administrations to 
mutually observe each other. Therefore, OMC processes are oriented towards 
increasing reflexivity and potentially facilitating mutual adoption and 
learning, ideally transplanting experiences from one setting to the other.  
 
102
  Work Programme of the Committee of Experts on the Organizational 
Aspects of Cooperation in Organ Transplantation (SP-CTO). 
 
AHMED, A LEAP TO HYBRID GOVERNANCE FOR EUROPEAN UNION 
HEALTHCARE ON ORGAN DONATIONS 
 
 
technical, scientific and administrative tasks. This would require a management 
board headed by an Executive Director who would be responsible for day-to-day 
management. The agency would be a valuable resource to the organ’s settings as it 
could retrieve information for all the national centres. The agency budget shall 
consist of a subsidy from the Community budget and fees paid by the national 
contact centres to register. To ensure transparency the budget of the Agency could 
then be scrutinized by the EP and Council and EU on public access to documents 
would apply.103 The Agency’s budget could also be available along with the audits 
that are required by the Directive in this sense the emergence of the governance 
structures together means that the organ policy would mutate in a hybrid that would 
rely on all three forms of governance structures.   
        This article also asserts that such an ‘integrated model’ may also be visible 
within the EFSA or EMEA, as these conglomerates exist of elements derived from 
Member State administrations, the Commission, the agency secretariats, agency 
committees, so called forums which serve as a basis for OMC type processes, 
comitology committees and private actors. None of these structures function as the 
decisional centre. In organisational terms the agency acts as the centre while 
decision-making is within comitology. The continuing struggle between the EU 
Member States for ownership between looms behind the comitology. Therefore, 
such conglomerates cannot be considered to be intergovernmental or supranational 
as they are not an extension of the Commission or the EU Member States. Rather 
these structures are a third form, which tries to fit in with the old 
intergovernmental/supranational paradigm. 
        These structures are partly based on hierarchy and partly based on 
heterarchy. They operate within a framework of a semi hierarchy and can rely on 
direct effect and supremacy but not on competence-competence. Rather the CJEU 
relies on persuasive jurisprudence to operate. These conglomerates are characterized 
by the need to combine elements of control and command with the insurance of 
commitment by intentional norms, which sanctions obstructions of the 
conglomerates ability to operate. The distinction between the OMC and the 
comitology committee is blurred and agencies have their own personality.104  
VII.           CONCLUSION 
Given the evaluation provided, this article has illuminated that the Organs 
Directive105, can be viewed as an exemplar of hybrid governance used within 
                                                          
103
 Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 May 2001. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/PDF/r1049_en.pdf. 
104
 CFI ruling stated comitology are not Community institutions just as they 
are not third part category in Rothrmans v. Commission T-188/97 ECR II 
2463. 
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 Directive 2010/45/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
7/7/2010 on Standards of Quality and Safety of Human Organs Intended for 
Transplantation.  
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healthcare. Such is an emerging trend given the EU’s Commission’s paper in 
December 2008 containing its policies within the Action Plan on Organ Donation 
and Transplantation (2009-2015) (the Action Plan).106 This Plan examined the need 
to improve quality and safety increase organ availability and make organ 
transplantations more efficient with the EU. The Plan came with the legislative 
proposal, which has now been adopted. The Organs Directive, which is now legally 
binding and will complement the Plan. Hence there will be a hybrid combination of 
hard and soft law operating together. The Directive (the hard law component) will 
deal with the organ exchange between Member States, promoting standardisation to 
facilitate patient mobility, as well as ensuring the health and safety of potential of 
organ recipients. It is hoped that the Plan (the soft law component) will deal with the 
gaps left by the Directive (such as details on allocation of the organs). Secondly, it is 
proposed within that the ‘integrated model’ may be utilized when applying the 
Organs Directive. The integrated model presents a fusion of the three governance 
structures the OMC, comitology and agencies. In the case of the Organs Directive it 
presents a ‘hybrid within a hybrid’ model. 
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 Action Plan on Organ Donation and Transplantation (2009-2015): 
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